UN Antagonism Towards the State of Israel Resolution 2334 of the UN Security Council: A Misinterpretation of International Law by Dolinger, Jacob
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
1-16-2019
UN Antagonism Towards the State of Israel
Resolution 2334 of the UN Security Council: A
Misinterpretation of International Law
Jacob Dolinger
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Miami Inter-American Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jacob Dolinger, UN Antagonism Towards the State of Israel Resolution 2334 of the UN Security Council: A Misinterpretation of





UN ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL 
 
RESOLUTION 2334 OF THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL:  





4TH OF JUNE 1967 LINES .................................................................64 
FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 ........................................66 
ISRAEL’S HUMANITARIAN POLICY ..................................................69 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) ADVISORY 
OPINION ...................................................................................74 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ......................79 
THEODOR MERON’S VIEWS ............................................................87 
THE NATURE OF THE “OCCUPATION” .............................................90 
HISTORY AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ..................................93 
THE PEACE DESIDERATUM .............................................................97 
ISRAEL’S PROCLAMATION ...............................................................97 
PALESTINIAN PROCLAMATIONS ......................................................98 
RESOLUTION 2334 VERSUS RESOLUTION 242 ...............................111 




On December 23, 2016, the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council adopted Resolution 2334 by a vote of 14-0 with the United 
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States abstaining.1 The Resolution addresses the settlements by Is-
raeli citizens in the “Palestinian territory,” including East Jerusa-
lem.2 It bases its position on the so called “4 June 1967 lines,” con-
demning all acts of terror and supporting a “two-state solution” and 
the achievement of peace.3 The Resolution classifies the State of Is-
rael as an “occupying power” that is obligated by the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention to protect Civilian Persons in Time of War.4 
The Resolution invokes an Advisory Opinion rendered in 2004 by 
the International Court of Justice.5 
I sustain the following: (1) the positions adopted by the Security 
Council have no basis in international law and they contradict the 
opinions of the major authorities in this field of law; (2) the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’s 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion on the settle-
ments, which the Resolution invokes, is devoid of any legal value; 
(3) there is no such thing as “4 June 1967 lines,” which the Resolu-
tion refers to; and (4) the Security Council’s position blatantly ig-
nores historical background, geographical realities, and the legal 
precedents related to the Israel-Arab continuous conflict. 
                                                                                                             
*Professor (ret.) State University of Rio de Janeiro Law School, Visiting Profes-
sor Brooklyn Law School, N.Y. (1989), Loyola of Los Angeles School of Law 
(1990), Capital University of Columbus, OH. (1993), Miami University School 
of Law (1990, 1997 and 2005), Hamichlalah Hakademit Lemishpatim, Ramat Gan 
(2008), University of Haifa Global Law Program (January 2012), Lecturer at the 
Academy of International Law, The Hague (2000). The author thanks Leonel Car-
aciki, PHD candidate at Ben Gurion University, Israel and Felipe Gomes Albu-
querque, assistant professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for 
careful research assistance. Thanks to Ambassador Alan Baker and to Professor 
Talia Einhorn for their advice and to Professor Mathias Reimann for having care-
fully gone over the whole manuscript and given valuable comments. The respon-
sibility for the contents is entirely of the author.  
 1 U.N. SCOR, 71th Sess., 7853d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7853 (Dec. 23, 
2016); see also Press Release, Security Council, Israel’s Settlements Have No 
Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security 
Council Reaffirms, U.N. Press Release SC/12657 (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm. 
 2 S.C. Res. 2334, ¶ 4 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
 3 Id. ¶ 13‒16. 
 4 Id. ¶ 3. 
 5 Id. 
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Moreover, I claim that the Security Council does not abide by 
the principles established in the Charter of the United Nations, re-
quiring the Security Council to follow international law and that the 
Security Council has not complied with Resolution 2334. 
After reviewing the favorable comments of Professor Theodor 
Meron, an eminent figure in the field of international law both as 
professor and as judge of various international criminal courts, on 
the Resolution,6 I strongly disagree with the points developed by the 
illustrious internationalist. While Meron insists on the need of Israel 
to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention on humanitarian rights,7 
I shall demonstrate that Israel did, and does, effectively comply with 
the principles of this Convention. Any Palestinian suffering is the 
exclusive result of the Palestinian leadership’s creations of organi-
zations that perpetuate human rights violations. Meron’s refusal to 
apply historical and biblical sources to matters of public interna-
tional law is strongly refuted by demonstrating that the great found-
ers of this field of law in the last few centuries have effectively in-
voked history and the Bible in connection with various principles of 
the law of nations. 
Resolution 2334, like numerous manifestations of the Security 
Council and of other international organizations, insists on the obli-
gation of establishing peace between Israel and the Palestinian Ar-
abs.8 I will show that the official constitutional documents of the 
Palestinian organizations clearly and emphatically advocate for the 
destruction of the State of Israel and that this desideratum is present 
in every manifestation of the Palestinian leadership, especially when 
addressing their people in their language. This contradicts the Israeli 
Proclamation of Independence of 1948, which proclaimed the deter-
mination to reach a peaceful accord at the time when the neighbor-
ing Arab states started their first war against Israel.9 
The policies followed by the Palestinians consist of a total rejec-
tion of the State of Israel; therefore, all trials to reach a peace accord, 
                                                                                                             
 6 Theodor Meron, The West Bank and International Humanitarian Law on 
the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-Day War, 111 Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 357, 
357 (2017). 
 7 Id. at 374‒75. 
 8 S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3‒6. 
 9 Proclamation of Independence, 5708 (2) (May 14, 1948) (Isr.), 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm. 
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including the efforts of U.S. President Bill Clinton, have failed. The 
Palestinians are not really ready for any concession even when pre-
sented with peace plans, containing an agreement to many of their 
demands. 
Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, approved immediately 
after the Six Day War, clarified that the devolution of territories was 
to be conditioned on the attainment of a full-fledged peace.10 This is 
in contrast to Resolution 2334, which demands that Israel immedi-
ately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, without conditioning 
it on the attainment of peace.11 As I will stress further, the settlement 
activities are a necessary defense against the terrorist war that the 
Palestinians have been waging against the Israeli population. 
THE RESOLUTION 
Resolution 2334 of the UN Security Council of December 23, 
2016, adopted the following statements and stipulations: 
1. The establishment of settlements by Israel in the Palestinian 
territory, “including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and con-
stitutes a flagrant violation under international law”; this situation 
constitutes “a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State 
solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.”12 
2. Demands “that Israel immediately and completely cease all 
settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including 
East Jerusalem.”13 
3. “Underlines that it will not recognize any changes to the ‘4 
June 1967 lines’ including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those 
agreed by the parties through negotiations.”14 
4. “Stresses that the cessation of all Israeli settlement activities 
is essential for salvaging the two-State solution.”15 
                                                                                                             
 10 S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 4 (Nov. 22, 1967). 
 11 S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 4. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. ¶ 12. 
 14 Id. ¶ 13. 
 15 Id. ¶ 14. 
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5. “Calls upon all States . . . to distinguish . . . between the ter-
ritory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967.”16 
6. “Calls for immediate steps to prevent all acts of violence 
against civilians,” and for clear condemnation of “all acts of terror-
ism.”17 
7. Calls on both parties “to act on the basis of international 
law . . . [and] refrain from provocative actions, incitement and in-
flammatory rhetoric,” and to rebuild “trust and confidence . . . [in] a 
genuine commitment to the two-State solution.18 
8-9. Calls and Urges all parties to endeavor efforts viewing the 
achievement of peace.19 
 
In its Preamble, Resolution 2334 sets the following points: 
1. Inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force.20 
2. Classifies the State of Israel as an “occupying power,” which 
is obligated by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention to protect Ci-
vilian Persons in Time of War, and refers to the International Court 
of Justice 2004 Advisory Opinion.21 
3. Condemns “all measures aimed at altering the” demography 
of the Palestinian Territory, including the “construction and expan-
sion of settlements, transfer of Israeli settlers, confiscation of land, 
demolition of homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians, in 
violation of international humanitarian law.”22 
4. Expresses concern that these activities imperil “the viability 
of the two-State solution based on the 1967 lines.”23 
5. Recalls the obligation “for a freeze by Israel of all settlement 
activity.”24 
6. Recalls the obligation of “the Palestinian Authority Security 
Forces to . . . [confront] all those engaged in terror.”25 
                                                                                                             
 16 Id. ¶ 15. 
 17 Id. ¶ 16. 
 18 Id. ¶ 17. 
 19 Id. ¶¶ 18‒19. 
 20 Id. ¶ 2. 
 21 Id. ¶ 3. 
 22 Id. ¶ 4. 
 23 Id. ¶ 5. 
 24 Id. ¶ 6. 
 25 Id. ¶ 7. 
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7. Condemns all acts of violence against civilians, acts of ter-
ror, provocation, incitement, and destruction.26 
8. Reiterates “its vision of a region where two democratic 
States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure 
and recognized borders.”27 
4TH OF JUNE 1967 LINES 
The Resolution is based on historic and factual mistakes and var-
ious legal misconceptions. 
The Resolution refers to “the 4 June 1967 lines.”28 There are no 
such lines. On that day, the armed conflict started between Israel and 
the offensive military actions of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.29 This is 
known as the “Six-Day-War.”30 The only lines that existed were the 
armistice lines signed between Israel and the attacking Arab states 
after the 1947-1948 war, which is known as the Israel’s War of In-
dependence.31 
These armistice lines derived from the cessation of the war 
waged by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as they invaded 
Israel.32 This invasion occurred immediately after the proclamation 
of the State based on the UN General Assembly Resolution 181, 
which partitioned the disputed land between the Jews and the Ar-
abs.33 The Jews accepted the partition and proclaimed the State of 
Israel,34 whereas the Arabs rejected the Resolution, refused the 
peaceful solution designed by the United Nations, and invaded the 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. ¶ 8. 
 27 Id. ¶ 9. 
 28 Id. ¶ 13. 
 29 Jeremy Brown, 1967 War: Six Days That Changed the Middle East, BBC 
(June 5, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Egypt-Isr., Feb. 24, 
1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Egyptian-Israeli Armistice]; Jordan-Israeli 
General Armistice Agreement, Jordan-Isr., Apr. 3, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 304; Leba-
nese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Leb.-Isr., March 23, 1949, 42 
U.N.T.S. 287; Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, Syria-Isr., July 20, 
1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 327. 
 32 Brown, supra note 29. 
 33 G.A. Res. 181(II) A-B, Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Palestinian Question (Nov. 29, 1947). 
 34 Brown, supra note 29. 
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newly created state.35 The armistice agreement with Egypt stipu-
lated that “the Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in 
any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated 
without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to 
the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine ques-
tion.”36 Similar statements were made in the armistice agreements 
signed with the other invading Arab States.37 There were no obliga-
tory boundaries as everything was left for a future settlement.38 
Instead of settling, the Arabs maintained their animosity towards 
the state of Israel. They did not take any initiative in favor of the 
creation of a Palestinian state, and after eighteen years, they started 
a new war that became known as the “Six-Day War.”39 The Six-Day 
War liberated Israel from any obligation regarding the armistice 
agreements.40 Consequently, Israel was free to wage a defensive war 
and to remain in the territories in accordance with the results of the 
war. 
Between the 1949 armistice agreements and the Six-Day War, 
the Arab states encouraged a succession of belligerent organizations 
to attack the population of Israel with continuous acts of terrorism.41 
Israel’s retaliatory operations, which were deemed to avoid further 
attacks, were always met with condemnations by the UN and the 
UN’s unfortunate change of attitude from a peacemaker to an ac-
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. 
 36 Egyptian-Israeli Armistice, supra note 31, art. 5. 
 37 Brown, supra note 35. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 399 (Sir Robert 
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“Thus during the Arab-Israeli 
fighting since 1948 anti-Israeli groups operating from bases in neighboring Arab 
states have often from there organized and launched hostile expeditions into Is-
rael.”). 
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complice of Palestinian terrorism—a continuous campaign of de-
monization of the State of Israel.42 In the Security Council, the So-
viet veto always protected the Arab countries from any condemna-
tion.43 
Before the Six-Day War, Egypt (1) closed the Straits of Tiran at 
the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, imposing a naval blockade, which 
prevented Israeli ships from reaching the port of Eilat, and (2) closed 
the Suez Canal to ships going to or coming from Israel.44 Both ar-
guably constituted casus belli.45 
FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 
The Security Council’s Resolution 2334 states that Israel has an 
obligation to abide by the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
“relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 
August 12, 1949.”46 
There are various problems with the attribution of competence 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories referred to by the 
Resolution. Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as 
Article 2 of the other three Geneva Conventions signed on August 
                                                                                                             
 42 See JACOB DOLINGER, THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE UNITED NATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A STUDY IN HYPOCRISY 387‒453 (2016) (pre-
senting a long list of UN attitudes and resolutions tainted with the gravest preju-
dice and greatest injustice, viewing the demonization and de-legitimization of the 
State of Israel). 
 43 Id. 
 44 This was not the first time that Egypt closed the Suez Canal. S.C. Res. 95, 
¶ 4 (Sep. 1, 1951); see also History.com Editors, Six-Day War Ends, HISTORY 
(Feb. 29, 2010), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/six-day-war-ends. 
 45 Definition of Casus Belli, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/casus%20belli (explaining that casus belli is “an event or 
action that justifies a war or conflict”); see also S.C. Res. 95, supra note 44, ¶ 4 
(noting that “Egypt was interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of 
goods destined for Israel” and that “the restrictions on the passage of goods 
through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected 
with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic recon-
struction and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to 
certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with 
the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, 
including the Arab states and Israel”). 
 46 S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
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2, 1949, refers to all conflicts that “may arise between two or more 
of the High Contracting Parties . . . .”47 Besides Israel, there is no 
other “contracting party” as the presence of Israel in the West Bank 
is in a territory which has never acquired statehood.48 Therefore, the 
territories referred to in the Resolution could not be a party to the 
Geneva Convention. The Convention expressly states in Article 
Four that “nationals of a State, which is not bound by the Conven-
tion are not protected by it.”49 The persons, which live in a territory 
that is not a state, consequently, are not a party to the Convention.50 
The Palestinians made successive declarations that it considered it-
self bound by the Geneva Conventions in 1982, 1989, and 1990.51 
But the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which acts in 
name of the Swiss government as the depositary for the Conven-
tions, responded that it was not in a position to decide whether the 
communications could be considered as an instrument of acces-
sion.52 This was due to the uncertainty within the international com-
munity as to the existence or non-existence of a State of Palestine.53 
Following the UN General Assembly’s resolution, granting non-
member observer state status to Palestine in 2012, Palestine acceded 
to the Conventions of Geneva.54 Can an adhesion to the Conventions 
                                                                                                             
 47 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention]. 
 48 S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 4 (explaining that Resolution 2334 recog-
nizes that it refers to “altering the demographic composition, character and status 
of the Palestinian Territory”; whereas, the Geneva Conventions deal with states, 
not territories). 
 49 Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 4. 
 50 Eugene Rostow, Correspondence, Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 717, 719 (1990) (“The 
West Bank is not the territory of a signatory power, but an unallocated part of the 
British Mandate. It is hard, therefore, to see how even the most narrow and literal-
minded reading of the Convention could make it apply to the process of Jewish 
settlement in territories of the British Mandate west of the Jordan River.”). 
 51 Information Notice, SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Dec. 11, 1990), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/fr/documents/aussenpoli-
tik/voelkerrecht/geneve/901211-GENEVE_e.pdf. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 G.A. Res. 67/229, Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab popu-
lation in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources (Dec. 21, 2012). 
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45 years after the beginning of the settlements have retroactive ef-
fects? 
Theodor Meron, who harshly criticizes the building of settle-
ments in the territories, says that in his opinion, “these measures 
deny contiguity and visibility to any future independent Palestinian 
entity, not to mention a state.”55 By which, he correctly recognizes 
that the territories do not constitute a state, not even an entity, in 
exact accordance with one of the main points of Israel’s position in 
defense of its policies. Meron’s basic argument about the applica-
bility of the Geneva Convention to the Israel-Palestinian situation is 
that “High Contracting Parties” referred to in the second paragraph 
of the second article of the Geneva Convention is not relevant to the 
situation of the West Bank because the applicable rule is that of the 
first paragraph of the second article.56 This paragraph also refers to 
“High Contracting Parties” so it could just as well serve to found 
Israel’s legal position. The fact that “occupation” only appears in 
paragraph two and not in paragraph one is irrelevant as the various 
dispositions of the Convention amount to one basic policy, and they 
all apply exclusively to states that are among the “High Contracting 
Parties.” Actually, because Meron throughout his article deals with 
the occupation factor, paragraph 2 should be the applicable rule. 
Moreover, according to Article Six of the Convention, its appli-
cation ceases on the general close of military operations and in the 
case of occupied territory,57 the application ceases one year after the 
general close of military operations.58 In this case, military opera-
tions ended fifty years ago.59 Beyond the first year, the Convention 
maintains a few rules in force exclusively for the protection of the 
                                                                                                             
 55 Meron, supra note 6, at 360. 
 56 Id. at 363; see Geneva Convention, supra note 47. Article 2 of the Geneva 
Convention states that (1) “[i]n addition to the provisions which shall be imple-
mented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared 
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the 
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them,” and (2) “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.” Geneva Convention, supra note 47. 
 57 Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 6. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
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rights of individuals of humanitarian character provided that the oc-
cupier exercises the functions of government in the territory.60 This 
is not the case in the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority is 
the governing power. Moreover, the Resolution fails to indicate 
which issues of individual humanitarian protection have been disre-
spected by Israel. The Resolution also ignores the grave violations 
of basic human rights practiced by the Palestinian governing bodies 
against their own people, which include the following: (1) the sup-
pression of criticism, (2) the public executions with no due process 
of law of Arabs suspected of collaborating with Israel, (3) the lack 
of freedom of expression, (4) the expropriation of private property 
without judicial order, and (5) the many other violations of basic 
human rights. A simple illustration of the projected Palestinian state 
is the fact that Mahmoud Abbas, elected for a four-year term in early 
2005, continues in power eight years beyond his mandate, ruling 
with dictatorial powers.61 
ISRAEL’S HUMANITARIAN POLICY 
Israel has indeed abided by the humanitarian provisions of the 
Geneva Convention, announcing its position in a letter to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross as follows: 
Israel maintains that in view of the sui generis status 
of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, the de jure ap-
plicability of the Fourth Convention to these areas is 
doubtful. Israel prefers to leave aside the legal ques-
tion of the status of these areas and has decided, since 
1967, to act de facto in accordance with the humani-
tarian provisions of the Convention.62 
An important illustration of the treatment the Palestinians re-
ceive from Israel is the attitude of the Israeli Supreme Court towards 
                                                                                                             
 60 Id. 
 61 Khaled Abu Toameh, Palestinians: Naming Abbas as PM violates basic 
law, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 8, 2012), at A1. 
 62 Cf. Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and 
Samaria (the West Bank) and to the Gaza Strip, 24 Isʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 485, 489 (1990). 
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Palestinians. First, the Supreme Court could very easily avoid judg-
ing any claim of the Palestinians because they are not located within 
Israel’s territory, and thus, there is no jurisdiction. But the contrary 
has occurred. Any request, complaint, or other approach of the Pal-
estinians to the Israeli Supreme Court is duly examined and decided 
upon.63 While Palestinians are limited to lower courts in land cases, 
in other cases, the Palestinians have been successful in attaining 
their requests from the Supreme Court.64 
In Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, the 
Supreme Court decided whether a fence that the government was 
erecting as protection against terrorist attacks would disturb the lives 
of the inhabitants of the Beit Sourik village.65 The Supreme Court 
requested and received various analyses from experts that ranged 
from military matters and humanitarian principles to the principle of 
proportionality66 and decided that the fence, which in itself the Su-
preme Court considered perfectly legal, demonstrating the error of 
the contrary opinion of the International Court of Justice, should 
change its route in order to ease the life of the inhabitants of that 
particular village.67 This change, according to the expert assess-
ments received, would still protect the safety of the Israeli popula-
tion.68 Considering all the evidence presented, the Supreme Court 
decided which segments of the fence illegally violated the rights of 
the Arab population and which segments were legal in accordance 
with international law.69 
                                                                                                             
 63 Tovah Lazaroff, Committee OK’s Bill Limiting Palestinian Access to High 
Court of Justice, JERUSALEM POST (July 12, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-
News/Comittee-OKs-bill-limiting-Palestinian-access-to-High-Court-of-Justice-
562283. 
 64 Id. 
 65 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel 58(5) 
P.D. 807, 807 (2004) (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf [here-
inafter Beit Sourik Village] (Reprinted with permission of the Israeli Supreme 
Court and available at www.court.go.il); see also HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vil-
lage v. Government of Israel 58(5) P.D. 807, 38 Isʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 83 (2005) (English 
translation of decision). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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Aharon Barak, the president of the court, referred in his opinion 
in Beit Sourik to another case—Ajuri v. IDF Commander—where 
he had described the security situation prevalent in Israel: 
Israel’s fight is complex. Together with other means, 
the Palestinian use guided human bombs. These sui-
cide bombers reach every place where Israelis can be 
found (within the boundaries of the State of Israel 
and in the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria 
and the Gaza Strip). They sow destruction and spill 
blood in the cities and towns. The forces fighting 
against Israel are terrorists, they are not members of 
a regular army; they do not wear uniforms; they hide 
among the Palestinian population in the territories, 
including inside holy sites; they are supported by part 
of the civilian population and by their families and 
relatives.70 
In this decision, the Supreme Court described the systematic and 
careful procedures followed by the Israeli authorities for the erection 
of the fence,71 which characterize the respect and consideration of 
the Israeli authorities to the Arab population of the West Bank. This 
is the description: 
Parts of the separation fence are being erected on 
land which is not privately owned. Other parts are 
being erected on private land. In such circumstances 
– and in light of the security necessities – an order of 
seizure is issued by the Commander of the IDF forces 
in the area of Judea and Samaria. Pursuant to stand-
ard procedure, every land owner whose land is seized 
will receive compensation for the use of his land. Af-
ter the order of seizure is signed, it is brought to the 
attention of the public, and proper liaison body of the 
Palestinian Authority is contacted. An announce-
ment is relayed to the residents, and each interested 
party is invited to participate in a survey of the area 
                                                                                                             
 70 HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander 56(6) PD 352, 358 (2002) (Isr.). 
 71 Beit Sourik Village, supra note 65. 
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affected by the order of seizure, . . . . A few days after 
the order is issued, a survey is taken of the area, with 
the participation of the landowners, in order to point 
out the land which is about to be seized. 
After the survey, a one week leave is granted to the 
landowners, so that they may submit an appeal to the 
military commander. The substance of the appeal is 
examined. Where it is possible, an attempt is made to 
reach understanding with the landowner. If the ap-
peal is denied, leave of one additional week is given 
to the land owner, so that he may petition the High 
Court of Justice.72 
As the various cases that were judged by the Supreme Court of 
Israel demonstrate, the arguments of the Arab owners are taken in 
due consideration, experts’ opinions are accepted and examined, and 
the Supreme Court considers whether the direction of a fence should 
be modified. In some cases, this is exactly what happens and the 
court orders the military authorities to modify the direction of the 
fence. 
It would be very difficult, if possible at all, to indicate a similar 
respectful attitude to the people of an occupied land by an occupying 
authority or by any court in the civilized world at any time. 
The concluding paragraph of this decision is an important con-
tribution to the major modern legal problem – Democracy versus 
Terrorism. It reads as follows: 
Our task is difficult. We are members of Israeli soci-
ety. Although we are sometimes in an ivory tower, 
that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not 
infrequently hit by ruthless terror. We are aware of 
the killing and destruction wrought by the terror 
against the state and its citizens. As any other Israe-
lis, we too recognize the need to defend the country 
and its citizens against the wounds inflicted by terror. 
We are aware that in the short term, this judgment 
will not make the state’s struggle against those rising 
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up against it easier. But we are judges. When we sit 
in judgment, we are subject to judgment. We act ac-
cording to our best conscience and understanding. 
Regarding the state’s struggle against the terror that 
rises against it, we are convinced that at the end of 
the day, a struggle according to the law will 
strengthen her power and her spirit. There is no se-
curity without law. Satisfying the provision of the 
law is an aspect of national security.73 
Israel’s presence brought positive results to the economy of the 
territories and to the health conditions of the Palestinian popula-
tion.74 For example, from 1967 to 2000, life expectancy increased 
from 48 to 72, and infant mortality plummeted from 60 per thousand 
live births to 15.75 This occurred as Israel built more than one hun-
dred clinics, offered comprehensive health insurance, and modern-
ized and expanded sewage and electrical infrastructures.76 In the po-
litical arena, under Israeli rule, the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria, 
and Gaza exercised political freedoms. This included “freedom of 
the press, freedom of association, enfranchisement of women and 
the ability to seek the protection of the Israeli court system.”77 
And then came the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, “when 98 percent of the Pal-
estinians living in these areas came under the jurisdiction of the Pal-
estinian Authority . . . which ended the freedoms the Palestinians 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. at 132; see also Dolinger, supra note 42, at 382‒386. This is the essence 
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had enjoyed under Israeli rule and torpedoed their economy.”78 
These facts, as they evolved in the 1990s, demonstrate the harsh in-
justice that Israel suffers when the Security Council ironically orders 
the Jewish State to extend humanitarian protection to the Palestini-
ans. 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) ADVISORY 
OPINION 
The Resolution invokes the Advisory Opinion rendered on July 
9, 2004, by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).79 This is the ad-
visory opinion regarding the fence (which the ICJ called the wall) 
that Israel erected to defend its citizens from the daily terrorist at-
tacks by Arabs living in the territories.80 
In the first place, an ICJ Advisory Opinion is not a binding legal 
source.81 It is a mere opinion furnished by the court to the General 
Assembly of the UN.82 As its denomination indicates, it is an advi-
sory opinion and not a judgment. Thus, an advisory opinion is a de-
cision of political—and not legal—nature. As a matter of fact, it is 
known that some of the judges of the ICJ rule in accordance with 
the interests and or policies of the states of their citizenship.83 This 
occurs as they are sent to serve at the ICJ by their nation’s govern-
ments.84 Amichai Cohen observes that “the identity of the judges in 
                                                                                                             
 78 Id. at 116, 119. Caroline Glick’s advocacy of a “One State Plan for Peace 
in the Middle East” is based on the rationale that “[a]pplying Israeli law to the 
areas would end the authoritarian repression that the Palestinians suffer under the 
rule of the Palestinian Authority. As permanent residents of Israel, with the option 
of applying for Israeli citizenship, the Palestinians would find themselves living 
in a liberal democracy where their individual rights are protected.” Id. at 119. The 
author informs that during the Palestinian uprising against Israel from 1988 to 
1991, Palestinians killed about a thousand of their own people whom they accused 
of collaborating with Israel. Id. at 116, 119. 
 79 S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
 80 Rep. of the I.C.J, at 4, U.N. Doc A/59/4 (Aug. 1, 2003 – July 31, 2004). 
 81 See Advisory Proceedings, I.C.J., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-the-
court-works (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see also The Court, I.C.J., http://www.icj-
cij.org/en/court (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Eric Posner & Miguel F.P.de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Jus-
tice, Biased?, 34 Tʜᴇ J. ᴏꜰ Lᴇɢᴀʟ Sᴛᴜᴅ. 599, 599, 624 (2005). 
 84 Id. 
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international courts, their politics, values and independence from 
political control should become major issues in the debate over in-
ternational law.”85 
It is important to analyze the 2004 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ 
to perceive the depth of the Security Council’s one-sidedness in Res-
olution 2334.86 It is also important to compare the Resolution to sim-
ilar Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council of Human 
Rights, which are entirely prejudiced regarding the position and the 
policies of Israel.87 This analysis will demonstrate how the UN or-
gans have no problem making decisions and resolutions on the Is-
rael-Arab conflict in spite of all evidence and against elementary 
common sense. 
The 2004 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ is in total conflict with 
the facts that brought about the occupation. It is tainted by flagrant 
incorrect descriptions of the successive events that form the ongoing 
Middle East conflict. Moreover, the 2004 Advisory Opinion in-
cludes a short historical review, which refers to the War of Inde-
pendence of 1948 in the following terms: “Israel proclaimed its in-
dependence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution; 
armed conflict broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States 
and the Plan of Partition was not implemented.”88 Here, the ICJ tries 
to hide the universally known fact that the Arab states, unwilling to 
accept the proclamation of the State of Israel, attacked and invaded 
the territory designated by the UN Partition Plan to become the Jew-
ish State. 
How can the Court, an integral part of the UN, ignore the state-
ment of Trygve Lie, the first secretary general of the same organi-
zation? Lie stated, “The invasion of Palestine by the Arab States was 
the first armed aggression which the world has seen since the world 
                                                                                                             
 85 Amichai Cohen, Rules and Applications of International Humanitarian 
Law, 41 Isʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 41, 67 (2008). 
 86 S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
 87 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-
EN.pdf [hereinafter Construction Advisory Opinion]. 
 88 Id. ¶ 71, at 165; see also GA, Res. 181(II) A-B, Resolution Adopted on the 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (Nov. 29, 1947), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181(II). 
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war.”89 Paul Johnson, an internationally respected historian, de-
scribes the aggression as follows: “A provisional government was 
formed immediately. Egyptian air raids began that night. The next 
day, simultaneously, the last British left and the Arab armies in-
vaded.”90 
The Egyptian newspaper, Akhbar al-Yom, quoted the Secretary 
General of the Arab League Azzam Pasha at a Cairo press confer-
ence. He said, “[T]his will be a war of extermination and a momen-
tous massacre . . . like the Mongolian massacres and the Cru-
sades.”91 
At the UN Security Council’s meeting on May 15, 1948, Mr. 
Tarasenko, the representative of Ukraine, referred to the armed 
struggle happening in Palestine. He referred to it as “a result of the 
unlawful invasion by a number of States of the territory of Palestine, 
which does not form part of the territory of any of the States whose 
armed forces have invaded it,”92 and in the same vein, the United 
States delegate, Senator Austin, referring specifically to Jordan’s at-
titude and its answers to questions posed by the Security Council, 
classified the Arab state’s behavior as waging a war and acting 
against peace.93 
The ICJ’s inaccurate statement that “armed conflict then broke 
out” does not bode well for the prestige of any court, let alone the 
ICJ.94 But when prejudice reigns, there is no limit to the level of 
misrepresentations that can occur. The lack of legal value of the 
ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion lies in its conclusions, which are 
based on uncertainty and are self-contradicting. 
In paragraph 137 in the 2004 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ states 
the following: “To sum up, the Court, from the material available to 
it, is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the 
                                                                                                             
 89 DORE GOLD, THE FIGHT FOR JERUSALEM: RADICAL ISLAM, THE WEST, AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE HOLY CITY 135 (2007). 
 90 PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 527 (1988). 
 91 David Barnett & Efraim Karsh, Azzam’s Genocidal Threat, 18(4) MIDDLE 
EAST Q. 85, 87 (2011) (translating Mustafa Amin, A War of Extermination, 
AKHBAR AL-YOM, Oct. 11, 1947). 
 92 Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of 
Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279, 279 (1968); Id. at 285‒86. 
 93 Id. at 9. 
 94 Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, ¶ 71, at 165. 
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wall was necessary to attain its security objectives.”95 Paragraph 140 
repeats the legal jewel: “In the light of the material before it, the 
Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the 
route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interest of Israel 
against the peril which it invoked as justification for that construc-
tion.”96 However, the strangest aspect of the ICJ’s conclusion is the 
continuation on paragraph 137: “The wall, along the route chosen, 
and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Pal-
estinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the in-
fringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military 
exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public or-
der.”97 
Thus, the ICJ makes two statements that contradict each other in 
the same paragraph. The ICJ is not convinced that (1) the route cho-
sen for the wall was the only way to protect the Israeli population, 
and (2) infringements caused to the Palestinian population by the 
route chosen cannot be justified by military exigencies, national se-
curity, or public order. 
At the same time, the Court is not convinced, and yet it decides 
with conviction! Which court takes a decision based on doubt, on 
lack of conviction? Why did the Court not order technical, geo-
graphical, strategical, and military advice? Why did it not look into 
Israel’s arguments contained in a document that the Secretary Gen-
eral of the UN attached to the consultation for an Advisory Opinion 
as this paper is hardly referred to in the decision?98 
Israel argued that in the forty months immediately preceding the 
erection of the fence, Palestinian terror attacks had left 916 people 
dead and over 5,000 injured, many of them critically.99 There is no 
word about that in the General Assembly’s request for an advisory 
opinion. Despite the unforgiveable omission by the General Assem-
bly, the ICJ could have easily looked into the Israeli submission and 
                                                                                                             
 95 Id. ¶ 137, at 193. 
 96 Id. ¶ 140, at 194. 
 97 Id. ¶ 137, at 193. 
 98 Letter from the Deputy Director General and Legal Advisor of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, together with the Written Statement of the Government of Is-
rael, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/1579.pdf; Construction Advi-
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double-checked the facts related, but it did not really care to search 
for the truth. 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins was very critical of the Court. In her sep-
arate opinion, she states: 
Addressing the reality that “the question of the con-
struction of the wall was only one aspect of the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict,” the Court states that it “is 
indeed aware that the question of the wall is part of a 
greater whole and it would take this circumstance 
carefully into account in any opinion it might give.” 
In fact, it never does so. There is nothing in the re-
mainder of the Opinion that can be said to cover this 
point. Further, I find the “history” as recounted by 
the Court in paragraphs 71-76 neither balanced nor 
satisfactory.100 
The Court says that “[i]n the 1967 armed conflict, Israel forces 
occupied all the territories which had constituted Palestine under the 
British Mandate (including those known as the West Bank, lying to 
the east of the Green Line).”101 Again, the Court reveals unforgive-
able historical errors because the territories that constituted Palestine 
under British Mandate included the following: (1) the territory 
which became the State of Israel, (2) the territories known as the 
West Bank, which was supposed to become the Arab State accord-
ing to Resolution 181 of the General Assembly,102 and (3) the terri-
tory known before as Transjordan, which is known today as the in-
dependent state of Jordan. In sum, Israel did not occupy the state of 
Jordan and could not occupy its own territory; this shows the ab-
surdity of the statement that Israel occupied “all the territories which 
had constituted Palestine under the British Mandate.”103 
In sum, when the Security Council bases Resolution 2334 on the 
ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion, one should bear in mind that both 
organs of the UN—the Court and the Council—coincide in their un-
                                                                                                             
 100 Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, ¶¶ 15‒16, at 211 (separate 
opinion by Higgins, J.). 
 101 Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, ¶ 73, at 166. 
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fair, unjust, illegal, and deliberately prejudicial one-sidedness re-
garding the conflict in the Holy Land. In Brian McGarry’s introduc-
tory note to the Resolution, he suggests that the Security Council’s 
upgraded language from “calls upon” to “demands” is a conse-
quence of the ICJ’s intervening opinion in Wall,104 “in which the 
Court found that Israeli settlement activities had contravened inter-
national law.”105 The Resolution is as incorrect as the ICJ’s 2004 
Advisory Opinion and both are illegal as I hereby proceed to expose. 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
When the Security Council emits a Resolution that deals with 
the legal validity of an act or a behavior, establishes legal obliga-
tions, and demands certain actions or abstentions from a UN mem-
ber state, as contained in Resolution 2334, the Council should base 
it on legal sources. An ICJ advisory opinion does not represent a 
legal source. 
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute provides 
that the ICJ’s function is “to decide in accordance with international 
law” by applying “international conventions . . . international cus-
tom . . . the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions,” and the “judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of the rule of law.”106 The letter of the law, the 
text of a convention, and the nature of a custom can only be under-
stood and applied in accordance with the most qualified jurists’ in-
terpretation and the Courts’ application of them. These two sources 
are known as Doctrine and Jurisprudence. 
Article 68 provides that “[i]n the exercise of its advisory func-
tions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the pre-
sent Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which 
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it recognizes them to be applicable.”107 Should we say that the ICJ 
decided the sources of international law stated in Article 38 were not 
applicable to the Advisory Opinion request regarding the “wall?”. 
Or, in other words, the Opinion would not be given in accordance 
with the sources of International Law. If so, the Opinion would not 
carry any legal effect. Therefore, the Opinion certainly does not 
carry any legal effect, and the reference to it by the Security Council 
is absolutely useless as the Council insists on the legal aspects of the 
issues under consideration and deals with the international obliga-
tions of the State of Israel. 
But it is not only the Rules of the ICJ that order the observance 
of international law. The whole structure of the United Nations es-
tablished in its Charter, approved in San Francisco, California on 
June 26 1945, is based on this major principle.108 
The Preamble states the determination of the organization “to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obliga-
tions arising from treaties and other sources of international law can 
be maintained.”109 Additionally, the Charter provides that “interna-
tional disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace” 
shall be settled “in conformity with the principles of justice and in-
ternational law.”110 In Article 13, the Charter charges the General 
Assembly to “initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
purpose of (1) promoting international cooperation in the political 
field and (2) encouraging the progressive development of interna-
tional law and its codification.”111 The Charter also prescribes that 
the Security Council will discharge its duties “in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,”112 which, as we 
saw, are based on “the principles of justice and international law.”113 
So when the Security Council states in Resolution 2334 that Is-
rael’s occupation of territories and establishment of settlements in 
                                                                                                             
 107 Id. art. 68. 
 108 U.N. Charter, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf. 
 109 Id. at pmbl. 
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the Palestinian territory constitute a “flagrant violation under inter-
national law,”114 referring to Israel’s “legal obligations,”115 we 
should assume that these peremptory statements have a basis in in-
ternational law and that the sources of international law for the Se-
curity Council (as for the General Assembly) cannot be other than 
the ones for the ICJ as established in its charter. This is what must 
be analyzed. Does the position of the Security Council in Resolution 
2334, like many previous resolutions of outright condemnation of 
Israel’s presence in the West Bank, have any basis on the authentic 
sources of international law? 
In 1967, the Israeli army entered the Jordan River’s west bank, 
a territory occupied by Jordan and now known as West Bank.116 As 
Stuart Malawer wrote, “the Security Council and the General As-
sembly refused to censure Israel for its 1967 attack against the Ar-
abs. The failure to censure Israel evidences an acceptance by the 
international community of the Israeli case . . . .117 This evidences a 
development of the United Nations’ practice, which allows a state 
to exercise under Article 51 anticipatory self-defense.”118 
Louis Henkin stated this theory very laconically: “If a nation is 
satisfied that another is about to obliterate it, it will not wait. But it 
has to make that decision on its own awesome responsibility.”119 
This theory appears very clearly in D.W. Greig as he writes that the 
“pre-emptive attack launched by Israel principally against the 
United Arab Republic in June 1967, is an excellent illustration of 
the circumstances in which a right of anticipatory self-defense might 
still be claimed.”120 
The next step is to verify the legality of Israel’s permanence in 
the territories occupied during the defensive war. A short editorial 
comment published by the American Journal of International Law 
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(AJIL), which became a classic, fundamental piece for understand-
ing the legal status of the territories, describes two errors.121 Stephen 
Schwebel, former judge and president of the International Court of 
Justice, distinguished between aggressive conquest and defensive 
conquest (I) and between taking territory which the prior holder held 
lawfully and that which it had unlawfully (II).122 
Schwebel explains that “Israel has a better title in the territory of 
what was Palestine, including the whole of Jerusalem, than do Jor-
dan and Egypt.”123 Thus, it follows that the modification of the 1949 
armistice lines among those states within former Palestinian terri-
tory are lawful if not necessarily desirable. Schwebel further stresses 
that “Egypt’s seizure of the Gaza strip, and Jordan’s seizure and sub-
sequent annexation of the West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem, 
were unlawful.”124 The seizures could not give these states “lawful, 
indefinite control, whether as occupying Power or sovereign: ex in-
juria jus non oritur.”125 On the same line and adding an interesting 
point of law, Elihu Lauterpacht summarized the situation: 
Territorial change cannot properly take place as a re-
sult of the unlawful use of force. But to omit the word 
‘unlawful’ is to change the substantive content of the 
rule and to turn an important safeguard of legal prin-
ciple into an aggressor’s charter. For if force can 
never be used to effect lawful territorial change, then, 
if territory has once changed hands as a result of the 
unlawful use of force, the illegitimacy of the position 
thus established is sterilized by the prohibition upon 
the use of force to restore the lawful sovereign. This 
cannot be regarded as reasonable or correct.126 
Comparing the post-1967 standing of Israel with that of pre-
1967 Jordan, Yehuda Blum added: 
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The legal standing of Israel in the territories in ques-
tion is thus that of a State which is lawfully in control 
of territory in respect of which no other state can 
show a better title. Or, if it is preferred to state the 
matter in terms of belligerent occupation, then the le-
gal standing of Israel in the territories in question is 
at the very least that of a belligerent occupant of ter-
ritory in respect of which Jordan is not entitled to the 
reversionary rights of a legitimate sovereign.127 
Julius Stone characterizes Israel as a “lawful belligerent occu-
pant.”128 He further states that “the status of these residual territories 
is not merely, as is too often assumed, that of territories under bel-
ligerent occupation; it is rather that of continuing dedication to the 
objectives of the mandate.” 129 
When Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq attacked Israel on June 5, 1967, 
they violated the 1949 armistice agreements.130 Israel’s “occupation 
of foreign territory” does not make legal sense because once the ar-
mistice boundaries were nullified, the West Bank reverted to its sta-
tus as Palestine. After the Arabs rejected the partition plan approved 
by the UN General Assembly in November 1947, the whole territory 
returned to its status of “land promised to the Jews” by the Balfour 
                                                                                                             
 127 Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of 
Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV 279, 293‒94 (1968) (“It would seem to follow 
that, in a case like the present where the ousted State never was the legitimate 
sovereign, those rules of belligerent occupation directed to safeguarding that 
sovereign’s reversionary rights have no application.”). 
 128 JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF Nations 
119 (1981). 
 129 Id. at 122. 
 130 Armistice Agreements (1949), in ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND 
CONCILIATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 35, 81 (Bernard Reich ed., 1995); see 
also Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Egypt-Isr., Feb. 24, 1949, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm01.asp; see Jordan-Israeli General 
Armistice Agreement, Jordan-Isr., April 3, 1949, http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm03.asp; see Lebanese-Israeli General Armi-
stice Agreement, Leb.-Isr., March 23, 1949, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_cen-
tury/arm02.asp; see Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, Syria-Isr., July 
20, 1949, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm04.asp. 
84 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:59 
 
Declaration,131 which was later approved by the League of Nations 
through the mandate given to Great Britain at the San Remo Peace 
Conference in its Resolution of April 25, 1920. 
Following the establishment of the British Mandate, the League 
of Nations determined in 1922, in accordance with article 22 of its 
Covenant, the conditions of the Mandate over Palestine and 
“charged the Mandatory government with the responsibility of es-
tablishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.”132 
The preamble to the British Mandate Document states it was 
based on the international recognition of “the historical connection 
of the Jewish people with Palestine.”133 Article Two rests the re-
sponsibility of “placing the country under such political, adminis-
trative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of 
the Jewish national home” on Britain.134 Article Six requires the 
Mandatory Power to ‘facilitate Jewish immigration,’ and Article 
Seven made Britain responsible for “enacting a nationality law . . . 
framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship 
by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.”135 
There is no mention of Arab national rights in the Palestine Man-
date, and there is no reference to political rights of the non-Jewish 
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population because the object and purpose of the British Mandate 
was exclusively to “reconstitute the political ties of the Jewish peo-
ple to their homeland.”136 The British Mandate only provides that 
“nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and reli-
gious rights of existing non-Jewish communities.”137 
The League of Nations’ creation of the British Mandate was the 
world entity’s recognition of the right of the Jewish people to estab-
lish its home in the Land of Israel, its historic homeland, and to es-
tablish its state therein. Thus, the right of the Jews to their homeland 
was recognized in international law. 
This recognition was inherited by the United Nations as per ar-
ticle 80 of its Charter which established the following: 
Except as may be agreed upon in individual trustee-
ship agreements . . . nothing in this Chapter shall be 
construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the 
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the 
terms of existing international instruments to which 
Members of the United Nations may respectively be 
parties.138 
The establishment of a national home for the Jewish people was 
tied to the whole of geographical Palestine encompassed by the ter-
ritory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, covering 
what is presently the official territory of Israel, as well as the terri-
tories claimed by the Palestinian Arabs. Geographic Palestine be-
came so after Great Britain detached the territory beyond the Jordan 
river, known as “Transjordan” to create the Jordanian state, which, 
originally, was part of historical Palestine and the British Man-
date.139 
The continuous terrorism, which Palestinian Arabs waged 
against Palestinian Jews practically throughout the whole Mandate 
period led the UN to depart from the British Mandate’s objective 
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and approve a partition plan. The plan divided what remained from 
the Palestinian territory into two parts. One for the Jews to create 
their state and one for the Palestinian Arabs to create theirs.140 De-
spite the abandonment of the original British plan approved by the 
League of Nations, which stated that the entire territory would end 
up as the Jewish State, the Jews of Palestine agreed with the partition 
for the sake of peace,141 whereas the Palestinian Arabs as well as the 
Arab States did not accept it.142 The United Nations did nothing to 
enforce the Partition Plan and Israel was accepted to the UN without 
being required to accept the boundaries proposed by that resolu-
tion.143 
As the Jewish State was about to be born, the Arabs attacked and 
invaded its territory and, as we shall further quote, the Palestinian 
Arabs declared the illegality of the Partition Plan. 144 The war waged 
by the Arab States ended with the agreements which established the 
armistice lines, whereas the territory that had been destined by the 
UN for the Palestinian Arabs ended up occupied illegally by Jor-
dan.145 This illegal occupation lasted from 1948 to 1967 when the 
Arab countries opened another war against Israel – the Six Day War 
– which ended with Israel – in a defensive war - expelling the Jor-
danians from the territory they had illegally occupied. This is what 
Stephen Schwebel is referring to when he compares the presence of 
Israel with the former occupation by the Jordanians – a legal occu-
pation versus an illegal occupation. In 1988, Jordan declared that it 
no longer considered itself as having any status over that area, so the 
legality of Israel’s presence in the territories reached to full consol-
idation.146 
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THEODOR MERON’S VIEWS 
Theodor Meron affirms that “Jordan would certainly be consid-
ered as the legitimate power, even under the Armistice Agreement 
of April 3, 1949.”147 Meron references Article 43 of the Hague Con-
vention (IV), which refers to “the authority of the legitimate power 
having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant.”148 Meron is 
probably the only legal authority that did not accept Schwebel’s po-
sition: Jordan was an illegitimate occupier. A position that has been 
agreed with by all scholars who wrote on the Six Day War and the 
occupation of the West Bank that followed. With the exception of 
the United Kingdom and Pakistan, Jordan’s annexation of the Pal-
estinian territory it occupied was not accepted by the world commu-
nity.149 Jordan later officially renounced150 any claim of any part of 
the West Bank, which must also be taken into consideration. 
However, Meron goes further and claims, with reference to Ar-
ticle 42, that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army.”151 That “a hostile 
army in this context means, of course, the armed forces of Israel.”152 
This is a total denial of the fact that Israel’s army entered the West 
Bank in order to save the State of Israel and its population from an-
nihilation by the invading Arab armies. The Arab armies of Egypt, 
Syria, and Jordan were the aggressive and hostile armies,153 whereas 
Israel’s army was a defensive army.154 This is clear from the various 
legal authorities referred to above.155 Meron lived in Israel at the 
time of that treacherous attack and should know better. The same 
way Israel’s army is not a “hostile army,” the West Bank is not a 
“hostile state,” as Meron puts it, regarding the obligation established 
by the Hague Convention to “safeguard the real estate belonging to 
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the hostile state.”156 The West Bank was not a state in 1967 and is 
not a state today, and so, it cannot be considered a “hostile state.” 
When Meron refers to the Fourth Geneva Convention rules re-
garding the occupier’s obligation “to assume active responsibility 
for the welfare of the population under its control,”157 he seems to 
be unaware that presently, the West Bank’s Arab population is under 
the control of the Palestinian governmental organizations that have 
total freedom to act according to their policies. These Palestinian 
governmental organizations maintain a tremendously hostile educa-
tional, religious, and propaganda regime towards the State of Israel 
and the Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Meron prefers to rely on 
non-governmental organizations like Human Rights Watch and 
B’Tselem,158 which are known for their formidable prejudice 
against the State of Israel.159 Meron claims that “individual Pales-
tinians’ human rights, as well as their rights under the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, are being violated.”160 That is true, but the violator 
is the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), not the State of 
Israel. The PLO does not allow freedom of press, freedom of ex-
pression, or all other fundamental human rights in the areas under 
its control.161 In the areas that were subjected to the Israeli authori-
ties’ control until the mid-1990s, the restrictions suffered by Pales-
tinians were exclusively related to Israeli security measures, in order 
to provide defense from terrorist acts.162 The same holds for the 
fence raised by Israel around Arab centers of population.163 This 
                                                                                                             
 156 Meron, supra note 6, at 359–60, 365, 369. 
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fence was exclusively for security protection as clearly established 
by the Israeli Supreme Court’s decisions supra.164 
To sum up, between 1947 and 1948, the Palestinian Arabs had a 
chance to proclaim their state as the Jews proclaimed the State of 
Israel. But the Palestinian Arabs refused to accept the General As-
sembly’s Resolution 181. The Palestinian Arabs did not proclaim 
their state and so did not achieve independence. Additionally, Jor-
dan illegally occupied that part of the Mandatory Palestine. There-
fore, we must go back in history and accept that the so called “terri-
tories” do belong to Israel. These territories became the home for 
the Jewish people via the Balfour Declaration, confirmed by the 
League of Nations’ mandate of the British, and inherited by the 
United Nations as successor of the League of Nations. This follows 
the doctrine accepted in customary international law of Uti posside-
tis iuris which determines the territorial sovereignty in the era of 
decolonization.165 This doctrine states that those “emerging from de-
colonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative 
borders that they held at the time of independence.”166 Bell and Kon-
torovich state that “applied to the case of Israel, uti possidetis juris 
would dictate that Israel inherit the boundaries of the Mandate of 
Palestine as they existed in May, 1948. The doctrine, thus, would 
support Israeli claims to any or all of the currently hotly disputed 
areas of Jerusalem (including East Jerusalem), the West Bank, and 
even potentially the Gaza Strip (though not the Golan heights).”167 
As I stated before, the refusal of the Palestinians to accept Res-
olution 181 annulled Israel’s renunciation to those parts of the Brit-
ish Mandate territories. Consequently, the territories returned to 
their original status as established by the Mandate and confirmed by 
the UN Charter.168 To characterize Israel’s presence in the territories 
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as an “illegal occupation,” as alleged by the Security Council and 
accepted by Meron, contradicts the legal international declarations 
and resolutions from the last one hundred years, which confirmed 
the history of thousands of years. 
THE NATURE OF THE “OCCUPATION” 
After examining the historical and legal matters involved, the 
Levy Report asserted that they: 
[R]estored the legal status of the territory to its orig-
inal status, i.e., territory designated to serve as the 
national home of the Jewish people, which retained 
its ‘right of possession’ during the period of the Jor-
danian control, but was absent from the area for a 
number of years due to the war that was forced on it, 
but has since returned.”169 
The Report adds that though “Israel has had every right to claim 
sovereignty over these territories, . . . [Israel] opted to adopt a prag-
matic approach in order to enable peace negotiation with the repre-
sentatives of the Palestinian people and the Arab states.”170 The Re-
port adds that Israel “has never viewed itself as an occupying power 
in the classic sense of the term, and subsequently, has never taken 
upon itself to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories 
of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.”171 
Indeed, the territories are not “occupied” in the sense of the Ge-
neva Convention. They are not “occupied” because this agreement 
is designed to assure the reversion of the former legitimate sover-
eign, which in the case of the territories does not exist as the territo-
ries had been illegally occupied by the state of Jordan.172 Another 
argument has been invoked: because the parties to the conflict were 
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Israel, Egypt, and Jordan and they signed peace agreements, not be-
ing anymore belligerent, there is no more belligerent occupation.173 
We shall see further down that the Ten Point Plan of the PLO 
denies the application of international agreements to the situation in 
the territories; logically, this also denies the application of the Ge-
neva Conference Agreements.174 
However, the pretension to apply Article 49 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention,175 which prohibits the occupying power from de-
porting or transferring parts of its civil population into the territory 
it occupies, does not apply to the Palestinian territories because the 
settlers came to the territories on their own initiative and occupy 
mostly non-privately owned land to build their homes, under the 
protection of the Israeli authorities. 
Alan Baker clearly explained Israel’s interpretation of Article 
49: 
The prohibition concerning the transfer of the occu-
pying power’s nationals to the occupied territory re-
fers to forcible transfers, along the lines of what the 
Nazis did. Article 49 was drafted after World War II 
and is aimed at preventing the kind of mass popula-
tion transfers the Germans carried out to alter the de-
mographic character of the territories they occupied. 
Israel’s policies ban forcible population transfers but 
do sanction voluntary ones; Israel has refrained from 
expropriating private land; the scale of the transfers 
is too small to affect the territory’s character; and 
what is most the transfers are not permanent.176 
Eugene Rostov stated that “the Jewish settlers in the West Bank 
are most emphatically volunteers. They have not been ‘deported’ or 
‘transferred’ to the area by the Government of Israel, and their 
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movement involves none of the atrocious purposes or harmful ef-
fects on the existing population it is the goal of the Geneva Conven-
tion to prevent.”177 In the words of Julius Stone: 
Irony would be pushed to the absurdity of claiming 
that Article 49(6) designed to prevent repetition of 
Nazi-type genocidal policies of rendering Nazi met-
ropolitan territories judenrein has now come to mean 
that the West Bank must be made judenrein and must 
be so maintained if necessary by the use of force by 
the government of Israel against its own inhabitants. 
Common sense as well as correct historical and func-
tional context excludes so tyrannical a reading of Ar-
ticle 49(6).178 
As the war of 1967 was a defensive war, to save Israel from the 
murderous intentions of the Arab States when they brought their ar-
mies to the armistice lines with the declared intention of invading 
and destroying the State of Israel, the same goes for the presence of 
Israel in the West Bank territory – an absolute necessity to protect 
Israel from further attacks, if not from foreign state armies, then 
from the armies of terrorists, Fatah, Hamas, Hizbollah, and their al-
lies and supporters, in sum, to replace the armistice lines that sepa-
rated the Jewish from the Arab States, which Abba Eban defined as 
the “Auschwitz borders.”179 
Indeed, the occupation is actually a protective measure. Consid-
ering the thousands of victims murdered and maimed by the terrorist 
attacks throughout the years, the Israeli population is much more in 
need of humanitarian measures than the Palestinian people. Between 
2000 and 2009, Palestinians killed around 1,200 and wounded 8,100 
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Israelis in terror attacks.180 One can imagine what would happen if 
Israel was not protected by the belt of the settlements. The Palestin-
ians’ argument that the attacks are a reaction to the occupation is 
unacceptable as the attacks have been occurring from the earliest 
days of the State of Israel as well as before that, during the years of 
the British mandate.181 All this leads to the conclusion that Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law demanded that Israel allow the settlements 
as means to avoid new military attacks, more terrorist waves. 
After Jordan and the Palestinians adopted the policy of execut-
ing any Arab who sold land to Jews, Israel allocated state lands for 
the establishment of settlements, in keeping with the Mandate of the 
League of Nations, which called for the facilitation of “close settle-
ment by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not 
required for public purposes” as stated in the League of Nations 
Mandate for Palestine, Article Six. 
The Security Council refers to “the inadmissibility of the acqui-
sition of territory by force,” and, in the next paragraph, it calls Israel 
“the occupying power.”182 A state cannot be seen as having acquired 
territory by force and be seen as an occupying power at the same 
time. The contradiction reveals the lack of precision and the care-
lessness with which the highest organ of the United Nations treats 
the conflict. 
HISTORY AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The fundamental conflict between Israel and the Palestinians 
turns on history: Who previously inhabited the territories? This 
question brings out the conflict between both sides’ narratives and 
raises the issue of whether history matters in the field of public in-
ternational law. 
In his comment on the 2334 Resolution, Theodor Meron de-
clares that he “will discuss the situation of the West Bank as a matter 
of public international law,” while refusing to address arguments 
“based on grounds of religious or biblical entitlements.”183 How-
ever, in the case of the West Bank, like in any matter concerning the 
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Holy Land, the Bible and religion are intimately connected with his-
tory which is a fundamental factor in international law. 
The importance of history in the development of Public Interna-
tional Law, specifically the history of Judaism and the Bible, is 
demonstrated in an essay published by the Netherlands International 
Law Review. The author, the eminent Israeli internationalist Profes-
sor, Shabtai Rosenne, goes back to many of the worldly recognized 
authorities of the last five centuries and quotes their statements on 
the subject.184 
Dominican Francisco de Vitoria and his successor Jesuit Fran-
cisco Suarez, Spanish Catholic writers known as the leading inter-
nationalists of the 16th century, “based many of their theories and 
deductions upon classical history and literature, using to some extent 
also the Old Testament.” In the 17th century, the Dutchman Hugo 
Grotius, “in the view of many the real father of modern international 
law,” cites the Old Testament fifty times and cites thirty post-bibli-
cal Hebrew sources (including the Talmudim, Targumim, and Mid-
rashim).185 
Shabtai Rosenne then refers to the Englishman John Selden, a 
profound connoisseur of Jewish law and religion and shows how his 
writing on the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noahides lead 
to the modern concept of human rights.186 
Rosenne states that Selden “was the nearest any scholar has ap-
proached, before or since, to a comprehensive evaluation of the Jew-
ish element in the basic notions of European international law.”187 
Rosenne proceeds to discuss Samuel Pufendorf, who followed Sel-
den in the references to Jewish law, having made “some 300 direct 
citations from the Old Testament and from the Jewish Apocry-
pha.”188 From these facts, Rosenne concludes that “in the formative 
or classical period of modern international law, nearly all the leading 
figures, both Catholic and Protestant, deliberately drew upon Jewish 
                                                                                                             
 184 See Shabtai Rosenne, The Influence of Judaism on the Development of In-
ternational Law, 5(2) NETH. INT’L L. REV. 119, 119‒49 (1958). 
 185 Id. at 123‒25. 
 186 Id. at 128. 
 187 Id. at 129; see also Dr. Isaac Herzog, John Selden and Jewish Law, 13(4) 
J. COMP. LEGISL. & INT’L. L. 236, 236‒45 (1931); see generally Isᴀᴀᴄ Hᴇʀᴢᴏɢ, 
Jᴜᴅᴀɪsᴍ: Lᴀᴡ ᴀɴᴅ Eᴛʜɪᴄs 1‒227 (Chaim Herzong ed. 1974). 
 188 Rosenne, supra note 184, at 130. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 95 
 
legal and moral source-material, so that a definite influence of Jew-
ish legal and moral thought derived principally, though not exclu-
sively, from the Bible.”189 Laws of war, maritime frontiers, innocent 
passage, and attainment of peace are matters of public international 
law that Rosenne connects to biblical and more recent sources of 
Jewish law.190 It may be concluded that when addressing the legal 
aspects of the presence of Israelis in the West Bank, Israeli leaders 
offer arguments based on religious and biblical sources, they are cer-
tainly in very good company. 
We find a similar attitude in the great Catholic thinker Saint Au-
gustine who wrote the following about law in general: “He who 
would lay down temporal laws, will wisely consult the law eternal, 
that he may discern amid its immutable rules what should be com-
manded and what forbidden.”191 Meron misses an important source 
of international law when he refuses to address arguments based on 
religious and biblical entitlements. Such a subject is critical when 
considering matters related to a land that is so important in the his-
tories of the three Abrahamic religions, especially considering that 
Judaism and Islam have a history of conflict and tension. 
Parallel to the Bible, the Qur’an must also be consulted. Abdul 
Hadi Palazzi, professor and director of Rome’s Cultural Institute of 
the Italian Islamic Community, quotes various passages of the Holy 
Book of the Muslims about the intimate connection of the Jewish 
people with the Holy Land: 
“O my people, enter the Holy Land which God has assigned 
unto you . . . (Sura V, vv 22-23)”192 
“And thereafter We said to the Children of Israel – ‘Dwell 
securely in the Promised Land.’ (Sura XVII v. 104).”193 
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He also quotes various other passages of the Qur’an which con-
nect the Jewish people to Jerusalem.194 
Meron also stresses that he will not address “defense or strategic 
issues.”195 However, defense issues are closely connected to human-
itarian law. Why deal with the application of humanitarian law to 
the Palestinian Arabs and not to the Jewish and non-Jewish Israelis, 
who were victims of thousands of terrorist acts by the Palestinian 
Arabs throughout the five decades since the Six-Day War, which 
was a matter intimately connected with defense? 
Chaïm Perelman, a modern legal philosopher, exposed the fun-
damental importance of history in every field of law. He wrote that 
“rationality, as it presents itself in law, is always a form of continuity 
– conformity to previous rules or justification of the new by means 
of old values. That which is without attachment to the past can only 
be imposed by force, not by reason.”196 Those with an interest in the 
origins of modern law, of both the civil and common law systems, 
are aware of the strong influence that Roman Law played in their 
development, the interconnections between Roman and Canon 
Laws, and the influence of the Old Testament on these systems.197 
History of law, with its constant developments, is intimately con-
nected with the history of humanity.198 
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THE PEACE DESIDERATUM 
Resolution 2334,199 a long list of previous Security Council’s 
and General Assembly’s resolutions, various European initiatives 
including the Quartet Roadmap referred to by Resolution 2334, and 
innumerous initiatives of the U.S. government have all insisted on 
the need to work towards the attainment of peace between Israel and 
the Palestinians. Resolution 242 of 1967, the basic United Nations 
Security Resolution on the territories, recommends that “immedi-
ately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties . . . aimed at establishing a just and durable 
peace in the Middle East.”200 Is peace between Israel and the Pales-
tinians attainable? 
ISRAEL’S PROCLAMATION 
Israel’s Declaration of Independence states the following: 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish 
immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it 
will foster the development of the country for the 
benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on free-
dom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets 
of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social 
and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective 
of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of 
religion, conscience, language, education and cul-
ture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; 
and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations.|201 
Further, the Declaration proclaims: 
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WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught 
launched against us now for months - to the Arab in-
habitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and 
participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis 
of full and equal citizenship and due representation 
in all its provisional and permanent institutions. 
WE EXTEND our hand to all neighboring states and 
their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbor-
liness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of co-
operation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish 
people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is 
prepared to do its share in a common effort for the 
advancement of the entire Middle East.202 
PALESTINIAN PROCLAMATIONS 
The Palestinian National Charter of 1968 includes the Resolu-
tions of the Palestine National Council approved from July 1 to July 
17 of that year,203 which contain extremely aggressive statements 
regarding the State of Israel. 
Before referring to the aggressiveness, it is interesting to note 
the uncertainty of the way the Charter of 1968 presents its people. 
That comes out clearly in Article One, which states the following: 
“Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an 
indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are 
an integral part of the Arab nation.”204 Article Four refers to “Pales-
tinian identity,” Article Seven refers to the “Palestinian commu-
nity,” and Article Nine refers to the “Palestinian Arab people.”205 
Article 15 goes back to “Arab nation” and refers to “Arab people of 
Palestine.”206 Article 22 repeats “Arab nation.” 207 So, we have 
“Arab Palestinian people,” “Palestinian people,” “Palestinian Arab 
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people,” “Arab nation,” “Palestinian identity,” “Palestinian commu-
nity,” “Arab people of Palestine,” and regarding the land, we have 
“Arab homeland.” This uncertain self-identification stems from the 
fact that there is no such thing as Palestinian people. The majority 
of the Arabs that live in the West Bank are descendants from Arme-
nia, Turkey, Syria, and various other Arab countries attracted by the 
Zionist pioneers that offered to pay for their work in the fields at the 
end of the 19th century if they came to the Holy Land. Later, Arabs 
encouraged by British authorities in the early 1900s migrated from 
neighboring Arab countries.208 The presence of the so called “Pales-
tinian Arabs” in Palestine “from time immemorial” is therefore an 
absolute fiction.209 
On March 3, 1977, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organ-
ization Military Operations Department, Zuhair Muhsin, told the 
Netherlands daily paper Trouw: 
There are no differences between Jordanians, Pales-
tinians, Syrians and Lebanese . . . .We are one peo-
ple. Only for political reasons do we carefully under-
line our Palestinian identity. For it is of national in-
terest for the Arabs to encourage the existence of the 
Palestinians against Zionism. Yes, the existence of a 
separate Palestinian identity is there only for tactical 
reasons. The establishment of a Palestinian state is a 
new expedient to continue the fight against Zionism 
and for Arab unity.210 
Romans named Palestine, which was invaded by different peo-
ples of diverse religions; whereas Jews maintained their permanent 
connection to the land throughout all of history.211 In the time of the 
British Mandate, Jews, Christians, and Muslims were all known as 
Palestinians. As such, they carried identity cards and passports. In 
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sum, it is a total misrepresentation to intuit an exclusive connection 
of Arabs with Palestine. 
The total lack of historic-geographic reality is present in Article 
Two of the Palestinian National Charter, which states the following: 
“Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is 
an indivisible territorial unit.”212 During the British Mandate, Eng-
land detached the larger part of Palestine to create what is known 
today as Jordan, which eliminated the pretended “indivisible 
unit.”213 The Charter also asserts a repetitious set of aggressive state-
ments regarding Zionism and the Jewish State.214 Article Four states 
the “Zionist occupation,” Article Six states “Zionist invasion,” and 
Article Eight states “the forces of Zionism and of imperialism.”215 
Article 9: 
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. 
Thus, it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical 
phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their abso-
lute determination and firm resolution to continue 
their armed struggle and to work for an armed popu-
lar revolution for the liberation of their country and 
their return to it. They also assert their right to normal 
life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-de-
termination and sovereignty over it. 216 
Article 15: 
The liberation of Palestine from an Arab viewpoint, 
is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist 
and imperialist aggression against the Arab home-
land, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Pal-
estine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the 
Arab nation—peoples and governments—with the 
Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard . . . .217 
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Article 19: 
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establish-
ment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regard-
less of the passage of time, because they were con-
trary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their 
natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with 
the principles embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations; particularly the right to self-determina-
tion.218 
Article 20: 
The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, 
and everything that has been based upon them, are 
deemed null and void. Claims of historical or reli-
gious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible 
with the facts of history and the true conception of 
what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, 
is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews con-
stitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they 
are citizens to the States to which they belong.219 
Article 21: 
The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves 
by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solu-
tions which are substitutes for the total liberation of 
Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liqui-
dation of the Palestinian problem, or its internation-
alization.220 
Finally, Article 22 provided the characterization to the Jewish 
presence in the Holy Land: 
Zionism is a political movement organically associ-
ated with international imperialism and antagonistic 
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to all action for liberation and to progressive move-
ments in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its na-
ture, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its 
aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instru-
ment of the Zionist movement and geographical base 
for world imperialism placed strategically in the 
midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of 
the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. Is-
rael is a constant source of threat vis-a-vis peace in 
the Middle East and the whole world . . . .221 
This is a very special document because it is unique in its ab-
surdities and aggressiveness. The Palestinian National Charter of 
1964 preceded this charter and proclaimed the following: “Palestine, 
with its boundaries at the time of the British Mandate, is a[n] indi-
visible territorial unit.”222 Articles 17 and 18 denounce and classify 
the Balfour Declaration, the “Palestine Mandate System,” and all 
that has been based on them as “illegal, null and void.”223 Finally, 
Article 19 denounces Zionism as a “colonialist movement in its 
goal, racist in its configurations and fascist in its means and aims, a 
permanent source of tension and turmoil in the Middle East in par-
ticular, and to the international community in general.”224 
In 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organization came out with 
another document, denominated “Ten Point Plan,” confirming and 
reaffirming the points contained in the Charter of 1968.225 Some of 
the objectives of this Plan are the following: 
Article 1: 
To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization’s 
previous attitude to Resolution 242, which oblite-
rates the national right of our people and deals with 
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the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The 
Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with 
this resolution at any level, Arab or international, in-
cluding the Geneva Conference. 226 
Article 2: 
The Palestine Liberation Organization will employ 
all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to 
liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the in-
dependent combatant national authority for the peo-
ple over every part of Palestinian territory that is lib-
erated. This will require further changes being ef-
fected in the balance of power in favor of our people 
and their struggle.227 
Article 3: 
The Liberation Organization will struggle against 
any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of 
which is recognition, peace, secure frontiers, renun-
ciation of national rights and the deprival of our peo-
ple of their right to return and their right to self-de-
termination on the soil of their homeland.228 
In 1957, Fatah, the military branch of the Palestinian organiza-
tion, issued its founding document, which declares, among others, 
the following points: 
Article 12: “Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of 
Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.” 229 
Article 19: “Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the 
Palestinian Arab People’s armed revolution is a decisive factor in 
the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this 
struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and 
Palestine is completely liberated.”230 
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Article 22: “Opposing any political solution offered as an alter-
native to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as 
any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any 
international mandate on its people.”231 
Going back to the original Charter of 1968, it is interesting to 
quote Article 24 which states that “the Palestinian people believe in 
the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, 
human dignity and the right of all peoples to exercise them.”232 Un-
fortunately, among the Palestinian Arabs as among most of the Arab 
peoples the following is a reality: (1) there is no justice as individu-
als suspected of treason are executed without any court of law judg-
ment; (2) there is no freedom as media is totally controlled by the 
governing forces; and (3) there is no human dignity as women are 
dominated by men and by the local dictatorships, homosexuals are 
not allowed to live, and whole populations are submitted to the dik-
tat of those who managed to get hold of power. 
Then comes the vehement, fanatical, hateful “Covenant of the 
Islamic Resistance Movement” (Hamas Covenant) of August 18, 
1988, pretending to represent authentic Muslim religious beliefs and 
principles, an eye-opener to the murderous, terrorist mentality which 
inspires this organization; Hamas is a close ally of the PLO, at least 
as far as the war against Israel is concerned.233 
Here are some of the statements contained in the Introduction of 
the Hamas Covenant: 
Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam 
will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before 
it . . . .Our struggle against the Jews is very great and 
very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step 
that inevitably should be followed by other steps. 
The Movement is but one squadron that should be 
supported by more and more squadrons from this 
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vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is van-
quished and Allah’s victory is realised.234 
In Article Two, the Covenant proclaims that its movement is 
“one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine.” 235 Article 
7 includes the famous call against the Jews that proclaims, “The day 
of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (kill-
ing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The 
stones and trees will say: ‘O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew 
behind me, come and kill him.’”236 Article 22 accuses the Jews of 
having been behind all important events of the last centuries, includ-
ing the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution, the First 
World War, and the Second World War. “It was they who instigated 
the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations 
and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through 
them. There is no war going on anywhere without having their finger 
in it.”237 
Article 28 is the best demonstration of how hate can blind: 
The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not 
refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil 
and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies 
greatly in its infiltration and espionage operation on 
the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the 
Freemasons, the Rotary and Lions clubs and other 
sabotage groups. All these organizations, whether se-
cret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and ac-
cording to its instructions. They aim at undermining 
societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences, 
deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is 
behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds 
so as to facilitate its control and expansion.238 
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Article 28 closes with the following jewel: “We should not for-
get to remind every Moslem that when the Jews conquered the Holy 
City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and 
proclaimed that ‘Mohammed is dead and his descendants are all 
women.”239 
Article 31 states that “The Zionist Nazi activities against our 
people will not last for long.”240 
Hamas’ opposition to any peace agreement with Israel material-
izes in Article 32, which condemns the peace agreement achieved 
between Israel and Egypt and declares: 
World Zionism together with imperialistic powers 
try through a studied plan and an intelligent strategy 
to remove one Arab state after another from the circle 
of struggle against Zionism, in order to have it finally 
face the Palestinian people only. Egypt was, to a 
great extent, removed from the circle of the struggle, 
through the treacherous Camp David Agreement. 
They are trying to draw other Arab countries into 
similar agreements and to bring them outside the cir-
cle of struggle.241 
Under the title of “The Testimony of History,” the Charter of 
Hamas goes back to the war between the Crusaders and the Muslims 
and the liberation of Palestine, which came after a twenty-year-war 
against the Christians.242 
To know the truth about the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas, to know of 
their intentions, desiderata, policies, and to estimate the possibility 
of any kind of peace agreement with Israel, one has to read their 
Charters, which are full of hate, venom, and clearly determined to 
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the destruction of the state of Israel. These Charters recall the suc-
cession of terrorist acts they have committed throughout seventy 
years since the proclamation of the Jewish State, and the financial 
prizes that the terrorists and their families receive from the Palestin-
ian establishment.243 To be convinced of the Palestinian mainte-
nance of their waring spirit, one should listen to the speeches of their 
leaders Arafat and Abu Mazen, especially those made in Arab and 
directed to their people. 
What is important for the analysis of the conflict and to estimate 
the possibility of attaining peace—as the Security Council insists in 
all its Resolutions—is that, Israel accepted Resolution 181 of the 
UN General Assembly,244 which decided upon the partition between 
Jews and Arabs of what was left of Palestine and for each to create 
its own state, and Israel also accepted Resolution 242 of the Security 
Council, which decided on devolution of territories conditioned to 
the establishment of peace between the warring sides.245 On the 
other hand, the Palestinian Arabs have declared the illegality of all 
documents, starting from the Balfour Declaration through Resolu-
tion 181 and Resolution 242.246 
As already noted before, considering the Arabs’ refusal to accept 
Resolution 181,247 the resolution became invalid. The Jewish right 
to its state goes back to article 80 of the UN Charter and, before that, 
to all international legal acts that preceded it, from the Balfour Dec-
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laration to the creation by the League of Nations of the British Man-
date for Palestine;248 that right covers the whole territory from the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.249 
Eugen Rostov put it very emphatically when he asked “how can 
the (Geneva) Convention be deemed to apply to Jews who do have 
a right to settle in the territories under international law? – a legal 
right assured by treaty and specifically protected by Article 80 of the 
United Nations Charter, generally known as the ‘the Palestinian ar-
ticle.’”250 
The Arab Palestinians have been coherent and consistent 
throughout the long conflict because they do not recognize the right 
of Jews to any part of the Holly Land and consider the Zionist move-
ment which created the state of Israel imperialist and fascist, and as 
they vow to destroy the “Zionist entity,” they must declare the “ille-
gality” of the Balfour Declaration and the UN resolutions, beginning 
with the Partition Plan of 1947251 and proceeding with the refusal to 
accept Resolution 242 which resulted from the Six Day War of 
1967.252 
Based on this review of the Palestinian’s official positions, it is 
easier to understand why all trials to attain peace have failed. The 
historic consensus is that, whereas in all the meetings, starting from 
Madrid in 1991,253 Israeli’s Prime Minister Rabin’s offer in 1993,254 
his successor Ehud Barak’s propositions in Camp David in 2000255 
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and in Taba in 2001,256 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s meeting with 
Abbas in Aqaba,257 the retreat of Israel from Gaza in 2005, 258 and 
Prime Minister Olmert’s peace offer to Abbas in 2007 in Annapo-
lis,259 Israel was ready with offers containing serious wide-ranging 
concessions, but the Palestinian Arabs systematically rejected them, 
never offering any counteroffers and never ready for any conces-
sions. 
In his autobiography, Bill Clinton tells how four days before he 
left office—six months after the Camp David meeting between Is-
raeli prime minister Barak and PLO leader Arafat, under the U.S. 
President’s chairmanship—he made a last trial to achieve a peace 
agreement, presenting to Israel and to the Palestinians what he called 
“parameters” which were all in favor of the Palestinians, even hand-
ing them the Temple Mount—the holiest site for the Jewish peo-
ple—besides conceding all their other demands. He reports how Is-
rael accepted the “parameters” and the Palestinians refused to 
agree.260 
In the last decade of the 20th century, the Palestinians pro-
claimed that they had adopted decisions to abrogate those provision 
of the PLO Charter that contradict the correspondence exchanged 
between Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 
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but no new Charter was ever drawn.261 In the early years of the 21st 
century, various Palestinian leaders came out with clear statements 
that their Charter continues in effect.262 
At the 6th Conference of the PLO in 2009, President Abu Mazen 
(known as Abbas) declared that the PLO Charter of 1968 constitutes 
part of the identity of the Palestine Liberation Organization and 
formed the basis of the organization’s political program,263 and as 
recently as 2013, on the occasion of the 49th anniversary of the 
founding of the PLO, he made clear that the original goal of the 
movement—the destruction of Israel—remains the goal of the 
movement.264 Glick adds that in a post on Abbas’ official Facebook 
page from October 11, 2012, Abbas referred to all of Israel as occu-
pied Palestine, making clear that he rejected Israel’s right to exist 
within any borders.265 
While negotiations were going on, the education of the Palestin-
ian children in school and the indoctrination of the Palestinian pop-
ulation in their mosques and on their television proceeded with its 
continuous, perverse incitement against Israel, which is in the exact 
spirit of their official documents. How could a Palestinian leader 
reach a peace accord in contradiction with their Charters and against 
the understanding and the feelings prevailing in his people as a con-
sequence of the education that the same leader has ordered? The ex-
ample of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who signed the peace 
treaty with Israel and was murdered by the Muslim Brotherhood re-
mains an unforgettable lesson for any future Palestinian leader that 
might adopt a different approach.266 
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That the UN organs continue insisting on peace is understanda-
ble; it is a simple manifestation of the hypocrisy that rules the world 
organization, a hostage of the Muslim-Asian-African conglomerate. 
What is not comprehensible is that an experienced legal scholar as 
Theodor Meron adheres to such a phantasy when he writes that Is-
rael’s “disrespect of an international convention would have such a 
direct impact on the elimination of any realistic prospects for recon-
ciliation, not to mention peace.”267 
One cannot take the UN Resolutions seriously after blaming Is-
rael for its occupation of the West Bank, condemning it as an illegal 
occupier. It is obvious that the occupation is not illegal because it 
happened in a defensive war and its permanence is equally so be-
cause the Security Council—in Resolution 242—conditioned the re-
turn of occupied territories (not all occupied territories) to the attain-
ment of peace.268 
RESOLUTION 2334 VERSUS RESOLUTION 242 
Resolution 242, which followed the Six Day War and to which 
all further Security Resolutions allude, did not even refer to the es-
tablishment of a Palestinian state besides the one already in exist-
ence on the East Bank of the Jordan river, the state of Jordan.269 
Resolution 242 states that the fulfillment of United Nations Charter 
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East which includes the following: 
[W]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories 
(not all territories) occupied in the recent conflict, 
termination of all claims or states of belligerency and 
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
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every State in the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries free from 
threats or acts of force.270 
When Resolution 2334 classifies Israel’s presence in the territo-
ries as illegal, it blatantly contradicts Resolution 242 which did not 
demand the withdrawal of all territories and did not even refer ex-
pressly to the territories in Palestine (the withdrawal could refer ex-
clusively to the presence of Israeli troops in Egyptian and Syrian 
territories) and conditioned these withdrawals to the attainment of 
just and lasting peace.271 
As Joseph Spoerl wrote: 
It is highly significant that Resolution 2334 begins 
with an explicit re-affirmation of Resolution 242. In 
doing so, it imposes a (historically false) reinterpre-
tation on the text of Resolution 242. According to 
this inaccurate reinterpretation, Resolution 242 calls 
for Israel to withdraw from all the territories occu-
pied in 1967 and presupposes the sacrosanctity of the 
1949 armistice lines as if they were the agreed-upon 
international frontiers between Israel and her neigh-
bors.272 
A strong position was enunciated by Eugene V. Rostov when he 
wrote that “the Israeli occupation of those areas is not only sanc-
tioned, but in effect directed, by the international agreements em-
bodied in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 . . . .”273 “These 
two resolutions,” Rostov explains, “constitute a legally binding ‘de-
cision’ that the Israeli occupation should continue until Israel and 
the Arab states of the region establish ‘a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East.’”274 
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It is indeed striking how Resolution 2334, though opening with 
the reiteration of Resolution 242 (and all the other Resolutions of 
the Security Council), flagrantly contradicts that first and basic res-
olution and the successive agreements between the parties.275 As 
Ambassador Alan Baker writes: 
Obama and Kerry are running counter to the 1967 
Security Council resolution 242, which is the basis 
for all of the Arab-Israeli peace process which calls 
for negotiation of ‘secure and recognized bounda-
ries’. The Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords make no 
specific reference to the 1967 lines. As such this ref-
erence would appear to be an attempt to prejudge or 
unduly influence the negotiating issue of borders.276 
Baker adds: 
this position taken by the United States (as well as 
the other members of the Security Council) also un-
dermines the basic obligation of the Oslo Accords, 
signed by the PLO and witnessed by the United 
States (as well as the EU, Russia, Egypt and others) 
that the permanent status of the territories, the issues 
of Jerusalem, and borders are to be negotiated. 
Gorali quotes Baker, stating that “after we signed those accords, 
we are no longer an occupying power, but we are instead present in 
the territories with their consent and subject to the outcome of ne-
gotiations.”277 
Another severe critique on Resolution 2334 was authored by 
Colin Rubinstein who sustains that: 
[I]t has made peacemaking between Israel and the 
Palestinians immeasurably more difficult by empow-
ering the Palestinian strategy of refusing to negotiate 
with Israel and “internationalising” the conflict – that 
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is, bypassing negotiating entirely and leveraging in-
ternational pressure to achieve Palestinian national-
istic and territorial objectives on their behalf and 
without having to accept Israel as a Jewish state, 
make genuine concessions or end the conflict.278 
And then he quotes another statement of Alan Baker: “Why 
would the Palestinians want to negotiate with Israel on these things 
if they’ve got a Security Council resolution that basically determines 
that east Jerusalem and all the territories belong to them?”279 
Also, the following is a very important observation contained in 
the same analysis of the resolution: 
It fails to distinguish between settlement blocs near 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv – where most Israeli settlers 
live and all serious observers concede will remain 
part of Israel under any conceivable two state out-
come – and isolated outposts . . . . Even worse, it in-
cludes Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, home to 
hundreds of thousands of people and, absurdly, even 
the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and the Western 
Wall of the biblical Jewish temple, to be ‘Palestinian 
territory occupied since 1967.’ In short the language 
of Resolution 2334 is a major setback for peace be-
cause it erases hard-earned compromises on a num-
ber of issues made in previous rounds of negotia-
tions.280 
The basic point of 242 was the obligation that “Israel withdraws 
its armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” All 
interpretations coincide that the withdrawal would be from “territo-
ries” but not from “the territories.”281 There is unanimity among 
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scholars and historians, as well as among the diplomats that partici-
pated in the negotiations for the drafting of the 1967 resolution that 
Israel’s armed forces would not have to withdraw from all territories 
occupied by its army. One of the basic points of 242 is that the with-
drawal of Israel’s armed forces would occur as per an agreement to 
be made as stated in paragraph 3 of the Resolution.282 
A simple reading of the Resolution leads to the understanding 
that the withdrawal established in article 1 (i) is connected and de-
pends of the materialization of article 1 (ii) – termination of all 
claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgment of 
the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force.283 
Moreover, the withdrawal referred to in the 1967 Resolution is 
of “armed forces” which does not affect settlements where civilians 
live and work.284 
As the Arabs in the so called “territories” have not given Israel 
a moment of peace with their continuous murderous terrorist attacks, 
in frontal disrespect of letter (ii) and maintain the criminal intent of 
destroying the Jewish State as established in their charters, the with-
drawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the con-
flict equally does not apply.285 
In sum there is no obligation for Israel to withdraw armed forces 
and or civilian settlements from the area. 
A NEW PALESTINIAN STATE 
The UN Resolutions and the Quartet Roadmap all insist that 
their main objective is the establishment of peace. Well, as Talia 
Einhorn stresses, “the dangers threatening Israel from the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state on land to the west of the Jordan River 
should deter anyone, desiring and seeking a true peace, from sup-
porting such a ‘solution’ to the Arab-Israel dispute, before the con-
ditions to peaceful co-existence are met . . . .”286 
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Since its establishment, Israel has met not peace but violence of 
the worst kind. As the same scholar writes: 
[T]he establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
should serve as a guide to the grave risks posed by 
such an Arab state, which may eventually lead to the 
destruction of the Jewish state . . . .The preconditions 
for a true peace require the Palestinians to lay down 
their arms and renounce terror and violence; to draft 
a new charter to replace the Palestinian National 
Charter of 1968, to recognize Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people and put an end to incitement against it 
and to anti-Jewish hate propaganda . . . .Palestinians 
must be ready for true peace and mutual respect in 
speech and deed. As long as these conditions are not 
fulfilled, the coming into effect of any agreement 
should be suspended on grounds of ordre public in-
ternational.287 
The basic problem is the Palestinian’s rejection of the Jewish 
people’s national rights as they are not willing to accept that Israel 
is the state of the Jewish people. This has been their consistent view 
and policy throughout the whole conflict. That explains their recent 
initiative to demand from the English government a retraction of the 
1917 Balfour Declaration.288 Without a total change of attitude, 
there is no possibility of peace. 
After such fundamental changes are implemented in the Pales-
tinian mind and in their system, at least 20 years would have to go 
by, until a new generation, with a new mentality regarding Israel and 
the Jews in general would come up, ready to concede and to make 
peace. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Israel’s presence in the territories is in compliance with the in-
ternational documents that established the right of the Jewish people 
over this territory. The concession made by the Jews to the Palestin-
ians by accepting Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly in 
1947 expired due to the Arabs’ refusal, which turned the legal status 
of the territory back to the Jewish people and consequently to the 
State of Israel. 
Resolution 242, on which Resolution 2334 pretends to base it-
self, does not refer to “Palestinian territory,” nor to “1967 lines,” 
both of which constitute innovations of the more recent resolution 
and are without any factual support and are devoid of any legal ba-
sis. 
Even for those who divorce law from history, Israel is still not 
an occupying power in the sense of the Geneva Convention as its 
presence in the territories derived from a defensive war into which 
she was forced by the attacking Arab armies. So, even if we were 
not to accept that the territories belong exclusively to the Jewish 
State, the belligerent attitude of the Palestinians demands that Israel 
and the settlements continue in the territories as a defense against 
terrorist attacks. 
The application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the situa-
tion in the territories has become a non-issue since 1995 (Oslo Ac-
cords) when the government of the territories was transferred to the 
PLO. Moreover, the Convention establishes various exceptions to 
its basic principle of protection of inhabitants of occupied territories 
whenever a matter of security is involved.289 
The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion has no legal 
basis, and it is a worthless document totally divorced from the his-
torical facts recognized by historians and legal scholars and without 
any reference to legal sources as demanded in its statute. 
The Palestinians’ standards of living improved considerably as 
long as they were under the administration of Israel, which commit-
ted no violation of humanitarian law. Regarding “demolition of 
homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians” referred to in the 
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Preamble of the Resolution,290 any confiscation of Palestinian prop-
erty was duly compensated, as well described by the Israeli Supreme 
Court in one of its important judgment connected to the erection of 
the protective fence as reported above.291 The suffering of the Pal-
estinian people derives from the treatment they receive from the 
leadership of their organizations, especially since 1995 when Israel 
transferred to them the administration of the territories. 
A “two-State solution” is only possible when there is such a will 
in both parties. The Charters of all Palestinian organizations are 
clear about their refusal to accept the State of Israel, declaring the 
intention of destroying it. Throughout all the years of the “occupa-
tion,” the leaders of the Palestinians have coherently maintained the 
aims of their Charters. A promise to change the main Charter has 
never been accomplished. So there is no possibility of a “two-State 
solution.” 
The vision of the Security Council of “two democratic states liv-
ing side by side in peace” 292 is a ludicrous dream. Is there a Pales-
tinian democratic state or any plan to create one? To what Palestin-
ian organization does the Security Council address this illusion—to 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or to Hamas? Does 
the Security Council not know that after Yasir Arafat’s dictatorship, 
his heir Abu Mazen (Abbas) proceeds in the same path? Does the 
Security Council not realize the lack of democratic life amongst the 
Palestinians—the wide-ranging violations of basic human rights un-
der which they live? 
And how does the Security Council foresee Palestine and Israel 
“living side by side in peace”293 and establishing the two-State so-
lution? Do the Palestinians wish to live in peace with Israel? What 
about the incitement in their schools, mosques and the press against 
Israel, against the Jews, and against peace? The Resolution’s con-
demnation of “all acts of violence against civilians, acts of terror, 
provocation, incitement and destruction”294 should have been ad-
dressed exclusively to the Palestinian organizations, to their school 
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system, religious and cultural propaganda viewing terror and de-
struction, and to their patronizing the terrorists whom they “com-
pensate” for their criminal actions by showering them and the fam-
ilies of dead terrorists (whom they treat as “martyrs”) with ultra-
generous monthly subsidies and by honoring their memories. 
The Security Council became a loyal serf of the radical Islamic 
states and submissive to the systematic falsities and lies of the Pal-
estinians, which are supported by a large and democratic group of 
states that, for one reason or another, accept blindly a false narrative 
and remain hostages to legal terrorism. 
The Security Council does not invoke one source, one authority, 
one scholarly work to base its repetitive claim that settlements con-
stitute a “flagrant violation under international law.”295 The contrary 
is true; all the great authorities of public international law not only 
recognized the validity of Israel’s military defense in the Six-Day 
War, but accepted Israel’s permanence in the territories. Between a 
military occupation and the settlements, the second option is the pa-
cific one. The Security Council does not explain why the presence 
of Israeli settlers is an obstacle to peace and to a “two-state solu-
tion.” A million and a half Palestinians live in Israel, earn a reason-
able living, and have all civil and political rights. So, why cannot 
half a million Israelis live in the Palestinian “democratic state” that 
the UN fools itself about? 
The reference to “4 June 1967 lines” 296 is a total absurdity as 
there were never such lines. The Security Council accepts any falsity 
that is put in front of it by the Palestinian and or the Arab states. 
Moreover, Resolution 242 calls for the negotiation of “secure and 
recognized boundaries” and the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords 
make no specific reference to the 1967 lines. As such, this reference 
would appear to be an attempt to prejudge or unduly influence the 
negotiating issue. When the Security Council “calls upon all 
States . . . to distinguish, in their dealings, between the territory of 
the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967,”297 it is 
expressing a clear support of the BDS campaign, a manifest call for 
boycotting. The Arab leadership does not care for the well-being of 
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its people which improves with the presence of Israeli enterprises in 
the territories. The Security Council follows the Palestinians’ poli-
cies as it does not mind to harm them, provided it can follow the 
demonization of the State of Israel. 
The Security Council refrains from naming who are the practi-
tioners of acts of violence against civilians—including the terrorists, 
the organizers and executors of the Intifadas, the inciters, the provo-
cateurs, the cruel leaders of the PLO, of Fatah, of Hamas, and the 
brothers of the Muslim Brotherhood—that have conducted attacks 
of all sorts against the Israeli population, that have killed children in 
kindergartens and civilian passengers in buses, that invaded homes 
and murdered whole families, and stormed into synagogues and 
killed people during their prayers. These practitioners have commit-
ted thousands of terrorist acts that have resulted in thousands of 
deaths and many thousands of incapacitated civilians. Regarding 
this atrocious campaign, the Security Council is numb.298 
And so, Resolution 2234 will go down in the history of the UN 
as one of the most absurd, illegal, unfair, and unjust acts of the world 
organization, prisoner of the Muslim-Arab-African-Asian conglom-
erate that has succeeded in bringing many democratic states to their 
knees. 
The UN started its illegal and invalid persecution of the State of 
Israel with the General Assembly’s Resolution 2253 of July 4, 1967, 
which stated the following: 
“The General Assembly 
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Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jeru-
salem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to 
change the status of the City, 
1. Considers that these measures are invalid; 
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures al-
ready taken and to desist forthwith from taking action 
which would alter the status of Jerusalem.”299 
The Jordanian government was the one that changed the status 
of Jerusalem with its occupation of the Old City, violating Resolu-
tion 181 that had established an international regime for the city. On 
this prejudiced approach, I have written the following: 
When the events are contrary to the interests of Is-
rael, when the Arabs disrespect rules established by 
the UN, no measures are taken, no resolutions are ap-
proved regarding their violations. But when Israel 
defends its security and its interests, a shower of res-
olutions rains down from the United Nations, pro-
claiming the illegality of the new situation created by 
the Jewish State. This is political terrorism.300 
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